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283 
BRAY V. RUSSELL:1  THE CONSTITUTIONALITY 
OF THE “BAD TIME” STATUTE2 
“It is a ‘bad time’ indeed when our society makes the turn in the road 
where we decided that prison guards shall be given the authority to 
impose prison time upon the prisoners under their control.”3  “The 
disciplinary system should no longer be the prison as the Leviathan but 
rather one that permits the maximum degree of liberty that is 
compatible with the fact of confinement.”4 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
“Once the prison gate closes, one enters an authoritarian ‘total 
institution.’”5  Prison inmates are involuntary residents who comprise a 
                                                          
 1. State ex rel. Bray v. Russel, 729 N.E.2d 359 (Ohio 2000).  The Bray court found that Ohio 
Revised Code § 2967.11, a statute which allows executive branch officials to try, convict, and add 
bad time to prison terms for criminal violations that occur during the course of a prisoner’s 
incarceration, is unconstitutional as it violates the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers.  
Id. at 362. 
 2. OHIO REV. CODE ANN.  § 2967.11(B) (West 2000) states in pertinent part: 
As part of prisoner’s sentence, the parole board may punish a violation committed by the 
prisoner by extending the prisoner’s stated prison term for a period of fifteen, thirty, 
sixty, or ninety days in accordance with this section.  The parole board may not extend a 
prisoner’s stated prison term for a period longer than one-half of the stated prison terms’ 
duration for all violations occurring during the course of the prisoner’s stated prison 
term, including violations occurring while the offender is serving extended time under 
this section or serving a prison term imposed for a failure to meet the conditions of a 
post-release control sanction imposed under section 2967.28 of the Revised Code.  If a 
prisoner’s stated prison term is extended under this section, the time by which it is so 
extended shall be referred to as “bad time.” 
§ 2967.11(B). 
 3. White v. Konteh, No. 99-T-0020, 1999 WL 587976 at * 6 (Ohio App. 11th Dist. Mar. 23, 
1999).  The decision in White was later affirmed by State ex rel. Bray v. Russel, 729 N.E.2d 359 
(Ohio 2000). 
 4. James E. Robertson, “Catchall” Prison Rules and the Courts: A Study of Judicial Review 
of Prison Justice, 14 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 153, 172 (1994) [hereinafter Robertson, Catchall].  
Robertson urges courts to be suspect of prison rules that constitute an exaggerated response to 
institutional concerns because offenders are sent to prison as punishment, not for punishment, and 
the conditions of confinement, including prison rules and regulations should be consistent with this 
distinction.  Id. 
 5. James E. Robertson, The Decline of Negative Implication Jurisprudence: Procedural 
Fairness in Prison Discipline After Sandin v. Conner, 32 TULSA L.J. 39, 39 (1996) [hereinafter 
1
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subculture in opposition to their keepers.6  Many inmates are chronic 
lawbreakers, not only outside the prison gates, but inside as well.7 
Disciplinary tribunals enforce official rules of conduct that regulate 
inmates’ lives.8  These tribunals have performed the task of hearing and 
deciding disciplinary charges.9  As a result, the prison staff can lawfully 
deprive inmates of constitutional liberties.10  Although the Supreme 
Court has acknowledged that the disciplinary tribunals staffed by the 
prison’s own officers face “obvious pressure to resolve a disciplinary 
dispute in favor of the institution,”11 the Court has not found their use 
unconstitutional.12  In Bray v. Russell, the Supreme Court of Ohio 
                                                          
Robertson, Decline].  Robertson defines “total institutions” as a place where all aspects of life are 
conducted in the same place and under the same authority, and where activities which are tightly 
scheduled are carried on in the company of a large group of others who are treated alike and are 
required to do the same thing, all in an effort to fulfill the official aims of the institution.  Id. at 39 
n.1. 
 6. John Irwin & Donald R. Cressey,  Thieves, Convicts, and the Inmate Culture, 10 SOC. 
PROBS. 142, 142-55 (1962).  See also HOWARD S. BECKER, SOCIAL PROBLEMS: A MODERN 
APPROACH 271-76 (1967)  (describing a number of studies on the extent inmates’ form a society of 
their own characterized by its own values and social orders). 
 7. Robertson, Catchall, supra note 4, at 154 (1994).  Robertson explains that prisons subject 
inmates to a number of disciplinary rules, some of which mirror the criminal law, and others that 
punish conduct that would otherwise be innocent but for the custodial nature of the prison. Id. at 
153.  He further explains that the disciplinary rules have a ‘catchall’ quality because they give a 
blanket authority to the prison staff which deny inmates fair warning of punishable behavior as well 
as provide prison staff with wide discretion in determining whether an inmate’s conduct is 
permissible or punishable. Id. 
 8. James E. Robertson, Impartiality and Prison Disciplinary Tribunals,  17 NEW ENG. J. ON 
CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 301, 326-29 (1991) [hereinafter Robertson, Impartiality].  Robertson 
explains the three approaches to staffing disciplinary tribunals. Id.  Under the historical approach 
custody officers adjudicated charges; a more recent approach utilizes both custody and treatment 
personnel appointed by the warden and; a third approach consists of a single hearing officer 
supervised by the commissioner of corrections instead of the warden.  Id. 
 9. Id. at 302. 
 10. See Robertson, Decline, supra note 4, at 40.  Robertson explains that while prison staff 
can lawfully deprive inmates of constitutional liberties, namely, those granted under the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, such deprivation must be preceded by “some kind of 
hearing.”  Id.  Inmates commonly refer to the disciplinary proceedings as “kangaroo courts” because 
an inmate is quickly in and out without any real justice taking place.  WILLIAM K. BENTLEY & 
JAMES M. CORBETT, PRISON SLANG 11 (1992). 
 11. Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 204 (1985).  The court emphasized that members of 
disciplinary committees are employees of the Bureau of Prisons who are directly subordinate to the 
warden who reviews their decision.  Id.  The members also work with the fellow employee who 
made the charge against the inmate upon whom they are about to judge.  Id.  In addition, the 
credibility determination made by the disciplinary committee is often one between a co-worker and 
an inmate.  Id. 
 12. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 570-71 (1974).  The Supreme Court held that the 
adjustment committee in a Nebraska prison complex that conducted hearings to determine whether 
to revoke good time was sufficiently impartial and thus did not violate the Due Process Clause of 
the Constitution.  Id. at 571 (emphasis added). 
2
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decided whether Ohio Revised Code §2967.11, referred to as the “bad 
time” statute, is a violation of an inmate’s constitutional rights.13  More 
specifically, the court was asked to decide whether the statute allowed 
for punishment without due process of law, deprived prisoners of equal 
protection of the law, and violated the doctrine of separation of powers.14  
The Court recognized that the bad time statute violates the doctrine of 
separation of powers, and accordingly, the Court did not need to address 
the equal protection or due process issues.15 
This Note analyzes the Court’s decision in Bray.16  Part II presents 
an overview of sentencing systems in the United States, the bad time 
penalty,17 and a brief background of the doctrine of separation of 
powers.18  Part III presents the facts, procedural history, and holding of 
Bray.19  Part IV analyzes the Court’s holding pursuant to the Due 
Process Clause rather than the doctrine of separation of powers.20  This 
Note concludes that although the bad time statute is unconstitutional as a 
violation of the doctrine of separation of powers, the court could have 
alternatively decided that the bad time statute also violates the Due 
Process Clause.21 
II.  BACKGROUND 
A.  An Overview of Sentencing Systems 
Generally, two sentencing schemes exist in the United States: an 
indeterminate system and a determinate system.22  In an indeterminate 
system, the legislature sets a range of punishment for crimes, and both 
the judge and the parole board exercise discretion on how long the 
offender’s sentence will be.23  In a determinate sentencing system, the 
                                                          
 13. Bray, 729 N.E.2d at 361. 
 14. Id. at 361. 
 15. Id. 
 16. See infra notes 95-141 and accompanying text. 
 17. See infra notes 22-59 and accompanying text. 
 18. See infra notes 60-74 and accompanying text. 
 19. See infra notes 75-94 and accompanying text. 
 20. See infra notes 95-129 and accompanying text. 
 21. See infra notes 142-44 and accompanying text. 
 22. Victoria J. Palacios, Go and Sin No More: Rationality and Release Decisions by Parole 
Boards, 45 S.C. L. REV. 567, 573 (1994).  Palacios explains that although no “typical” sentencing 
and parole system exists, general patterns can be distinguished and are classified as either 
determinate or indeterminate.  Id. at 573. 
 23. Id.  If the judge decides to incarcerate an offender, rather than exercise a non-custodial 
sanction, the term of incarceration is expressed as a range of time.  Id.  When an offender requests 
3
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judge, alone, decides whether to incarcerate the offender and exactly 
how long the offender should serve.24  This system allows offenders to 
know at sentencing the amount of time they will serve in prison.25 
In the past, Ohio’s courts exercised an indeterminate sentencing 
scheme that incorporated the theory of “good time.”26  After Amended 
Substitute Senate Bill No. 2 was enacted in 1995, 27 Ohio abolished the 
indeterminate sentencing scheme, and adopted a determinate sentencing 
scheme that abolished good time altogether.28  As a result, Ohio adopted 
a bad time theory of determinate sentencing.29 
B.  The “Bad Time Penalty”: Ohio Revised Code §2967.1130 
Ohio Revised Code §2967.11 (R.C. 2967.11) created a procedure 
by which the Rules Infraction Board31 of Ohio state prisons could punish 
an offender by extending an inmate’s prison term up to an additional 
ninety days for committing a “violation”32 while incarcerated.33  This 
                                                          
an early release, the release may be granted at the discretion of the parole board.  Id.  If the parole 
board grants the release, the inmate is placed on parole.  Id.  The article defines parole as a period of 
supervision under the rules contained in a parole agreement.  Id.  If a parolee violates the terms in 
the agreement, he or she may be returned to prison to serve all or part of the remaining sentence.  Id. 
 24. Id. at 574. 
 25. Id.  In the determinate sentencing scheme parole is eliminated altogether.  However, the 
sentence may be reduced for good behavior, generally referred to as “good time” 
 26. See former OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2967.13 and § 2967.19, repealed July 1, 1996.  See 
also James B. Jacobs, Sentencing by Prison Personnel: Good Time, 30 UCLA L. REV. 217, 221 
(1982).  Professor Jacobs explained that there are three types of good time: “statutory good time”  
rewards prisoners who conform with prison rules and regulations; “meritorious good time” rewards 
participation in prison programs and industries, and; “extraordinary good time” rewards prisoners 
who give blood, serve as experimental medical subjects, or perform such outstanding services as 
saving the life of a staff member or fellow prisoner.  Id.  He further explains that under a 
determinate sentencing scheme good time credits accelerate the date of release whereas under an 
indeterminate sentencing scheme, good time is subtracted from the minimum as well as the 
maximum sentence, which accelerates parole eligibility.  Id at 222-24. 
 27. Am. Sub. S.B. No. 2, 121st Gen. Assem., at 439 (Ohio 1995).  After the passage of Senate 
Bill 2, Ohio’s new law ends any involvement with the State Parole Board in modifying sentences.  
Id.  Thus, inmates will serve at least 97% of the imposed sentence.  See Reply Brief of Petitioner – 
Appellant Gary Bray at A-82, Bray v. Russell, 729 N.E.2d 359 (Ohio 2000) (No. CA98-06-068). 
 28. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2967.11 (West 2000) effectively replaced the prior sentencing 
scheme, and incorporated “bad time” rather than “good time.”  § 2967.11. 
 29. See infra notes 33-59 and accompanying text. 
 30. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2967.11(B) (West 2000) see supra note 2 for the full text of 
the statute. 
 31. Ohio Prison Rule No. 5120-9-091(A)(4).  This board is a panel that is designated to hear 
cases involving the possible imposition of bad time.  Id.  The panel is composed of three staff 
members selected by the warden specifically to hear allegations of bad time charges.  Id. 
 32. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2967.11(A) (West 2000) defines “violation” as an act that is a 
criminal offense under the law of this state or the United States, whether or not a person is 
prosecuted for the commission of the offense.  § 2967.11(A). 
4
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sentencing scheme is called “bad time.”34  It is critically important to 
understand that the sentencing scheme of “bad time” is inherently 
different from the sentencing scheme of good time. 
Under the bad time statute, an inmate’s release at the end of a 
sentence is not contingent on any privilege granted by the state.35  When 
the prison staff tries and convicts an inmate, a new term of incarceration 
is added on to the end of the maximum sentence already imposed.36  In 
contrast, good time is a state-created liberty interest.37 When an inmate 
loses good time credit for a disciplinary violation, the inmate is only 
losing the privilege of early release, a state-created privilege.38 
The bad time statute sets forth the procedure to impose an extended 
prison term.39  First, when a prisoner allegedly commits a violation,40 an 
officer investigates and reports his findings to the Rules Infraction 
Board.41  Next, the Board conducts a hearing to decide whether there is 
                                                          
 33. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2967.11(B) (West 2000) states that the board may extend the 
prison term for a period of fifteen, thirty, sixty or ninety days, but may not extend the term for a 
period longer than one-half of the stated prison term’s duration for all violations occurring during 
the course of the prisoner’s stated prison term.  § 2967.11(B). 
 34. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.01(B) (West 2000) states: 
“Bad time” means the time by which the parole board administratively extends an 
offender’s stated prison term or terms pursuant to section 2967.11 of the Revised Code 
because the parole board finds by clear and convincing evidence that the offender, while 
serving the prison term or terms, committed an act that is a criminal offense under the 
law of this state or the United States, whether or not the offender is prosecuted for the 
commission of that act. 
§ 2929.01(B). 
 35. Brief of Petitioner – Appellant Gary Bray at 11, State ex rel. Bray v. Russell, 729 N.E.2d 
359 (Ohio 2000) (CA98-06-068). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id.  See Jacobs supra note 26.  Ohio exercised a theory of “meritorious good time” in 
which prisoners could earn credit for participating in an education program, training or employment 
in industries and/or treatment for substance abuse.  See also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2967.193(A) 
(West 2000). 
 38. Brief of Petitioner – Appellant Gary Bray at 11, State ex rel. Bray v. Russell, 729 N.E.2d 
359 (Ohio 2000) (CA 98-06-068). 
 39. See generally OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2967.11(C)-(H) (West 2000). 
 40. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2967.11(A) (West 2000) See supra note 32 for an 
explaination of the statute. 
 41. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2967.11(C) (West 2000) states in pertinent part: 
When a prisoner in an institution is alleged by any person to have committed a 
violation . . . the appropriate official shall . . . investigate . . . and report . . .  to the rules 
infraction board.  [T]he rules infraction board . . . shall hold a hearing . . . to 
determine . . . whether there is evidence of a violation.  At the hearing the accused 
prisoner shall have the right to testify and be assisted by a member of the staff . . . to 
assist the prisoner in presenting a defense.  [T]he board shall report its finding to the 
head of the institution . . . it shall also include with its finding a recommendation 
regarding a period of time, as specified in division (B) of this section [2967.11]. . . . 
§ 2967.11(A). 
5
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evidence of a violation, and reports its findings to the warden along with 
a recommendation on how long to extend the prison term.42 
At the hearing, the inmate may testify, and a member of the staff of 
the institution is designated to assist the prisoner in presenting a defense 
before the Board.43  However, this “assistant” does not represent the 
inmate as would an attorney, thus any conversations with the assistant 
are not privileged.44  After receiving the report, the warden decides if the 
report provides clear and convincing evidence that the prisoner 
committed a violation.45  The warden then reports his findings to the 
Board and recommends how long to extend the inmate’s prison term.46 
Ultimately, the Board makes the final decision after reviewing the 
warden’s report.47  If the Board agrees with the warden’s report, it then 
determines the length of the prison term to impose.48  When the Board 
makes its decision, the inmate is not present, and the inmate does not 
have an opportunity to present evidence nor have knowledge of what 
other information the Board is considering.49  If the board has not 
reached a decision before the inmate’s stated time for release, the 
warden may hold the prisoner for ten days beyond his lawful prison 
term.50 
                                                          
 42. § 2967.11(A). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Brief of Petitioner – Appellant Gary Bray 729 N.E.2d 359 (No. CA98-06-068) (this 
distinction is important as an inmate is not advised of his state and federal privilege against self-
incrimination).  Id. at 4. 
 45. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2967.11(D) (West 2000) provides in pertinent part, 
If the head of the institution determines by clear and convincing evidence that the prisoner 
committed a violation and concludes that the prisoner’s stated prison term should be extended as a 
result of the violation, the head of the institution shall report the determination in a finding to the 
parole board . . . . 
§ 2967.11(D). 
 46. § 2967.11(D). 
 47. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2967.11(E) (West 2000) provides in pertinent part: 
[A]fter receiving a report from the head of an institution . . . containing a finding and 
recommendation, the parole board shall review the findings of the rules infraction board 
and the head of the institution to determine whether there is clear and convincing 
evidence that the prisoner committed the violation and, if so, to determine whether the 
stated prison term should be extended and the length of time by which to extend it. 
 48. § 2967.11(E).  The board determines the length of the additional term of imprisonment by 
considering the nature of the violation, other conduct of the prisoner while in prison, and any other 
evidence relevant to maintaining order in the institution.  § 2967.11(E). 
 49. Brief of Petitioner – Appellant Gary Bray at 4, Bray, 729 N.E.2d 359 (No.  CA98-06-
068). 
 50. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2967.11(F) (West 2000) provides in pertinent part, “If 
necessary, the accused prisoner may be held in the institution for not more than ten days after the 
end of the prisoner’s stated prison term pending review of the violation and a determination 
regarding an extension of the stated prison term.”  § 2967.11(F). 
6
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C.  The Purpose of R.C. 2967.11 
A review of the bad time statute establishes that the purpose of bad 
time is to punish the offender.51  Although Ohio has no legislative 
history on this matter,52 legislative intent is to be construed by 
considering “the entire act and the surrounding circumstances attending 
its enactment.”53  Bad time promotes retribution and deterrence, two 
aims of punishment for the violation of criminal offenses.54  As further 
evidence of this purpose, the bad time statute states, in pertinent part, 
that, “as part of a prisoner’s sentence, the parole board may punish a 
violation committed by the prisoner by extending the prisoner’s stated 
prison term.”55 
An important distinction between criminal punishment and 
administrative discipline is that criminal punishment is penal in nature 
whereas administrative discipline is regulatory in nature.  Moreover, if a 
regulation is penal in nature, it gives rise not only to the doctrine of 
separation of powers but also to all the protections afforded to citizens 
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.56  In 
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, the United States Supreme Court set 
forth seven factors with which to determine if a sanction is penal or 
regulatory.57  Based on the factors set forth in Mendoza-Martinez, the 
bad time statute creates a sanction that is penal in nature rather than 
                                                          
 51. See infra notes 54-59 and accompanying text. 
 52. State v. Dickinson, 275 N.E.2d 599, 600 (Ohio 1971).  The court reasoned that because 
Ohio maintains no legislative history of statutes, we must look to the source of the statute, and to 
judicial pronouncements to determine the statutes’ meaning. Id. 
 53. State ex rel. Mitman v. Board of County Comm’rs, 113 N.E. 831, 834 (Ohio 1916). 
 54. See A Plan for Felony Sentencing in Ohio: A Formal Report of the Ohio Criminal 
Sentencing Commission, at 46 (July 1, 1993) (recognizing that prison officials need tools to deter 
misconduct). 
 55. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2967.11(B).  See supra note 2 for the full text of the statute. 
 56. Thomas C. French, Is it Punitive or is it Regulatory? United States v. Salerno, 20 U. TOL. 
L. REV. 189, 214 (1988).  In this note, French explains that the court analyzed the constitutionality 
of the Bail Reform Act.  Id.  One factor the court considered was whether the Act was regulatory or 
punitive in nature.  Id.  The court reasoned that if an act is punitive in nature, it violates substantive 
due process, and if the act is regulatory in nature, it is constitutionally permissible.  Id.  The analysis 
the court employed was to first examine the legislative intent behind the Act, then focused in part on 
the test set forth in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez.  Id. 
 57. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963). Kennedy set forth the seven 
factors as follows: (1) whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint; (2) 
whether it has historically been regarded as punishment; (3) whether it comes into play only on a 
finding of scienter; (4) whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment-
retribution deterrence; (5) whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime; (6) whether 
an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it; and (7)  whether 
it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned.  Id. 
7
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regulatory.58  Thus, offenders sentenced under the bad time statute are 
entitled to invoke all the protections afforded to them by the Due Process 
Clause.59 
D.  Separation of Powers 
“There is no liberty if the power of judging be not separated from 
the legislative and executive powers.”60The doctrine of separation of 
powers is a political theory that both the Framers of the United States 
Constitution and the Anti-Federalists regarded as an essential element in 
structuring the government.61  However, the Framers were not certain 
what exactly the doctrine required, and thus made no effort to adhere to 
it rigidly when they drafted the Constitution.62  Instead, the Framers 
assigned some functions that would appear to belong solely to one of the 
other branches in order to create a system of checks and balances.63 
                                                          
 58. Cf. id.  (explaining that factors relevant to whether a statute is penal or regulatory in 
character include; (1) whether it has historically been regarded as punishment; (2) whether behavior 
to which it applies is already a crime; (3) whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or 
restraint; and (4) whether the operation will promote traditional aims of punishment). 
 59. See infra notes 102-15 and accompanying text. 
 60. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison).  Madison explains that when Montesquieu 
made this statement he did not mean that the departments ought to have no partial agency in, or no 
control over, the acts of each other.  Id.  Instead, Madison argues that Montesquieu meant that 
where the whole power of one department is exercised by the same hands that possess the whole 
power of another department, the fundamental principles of a free constitution are subverted.  Id.  
Madison stated that,  “[t]he accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the 
same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self appointed, or elective, 
may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.  In order to form correct ideas on this 
important subject, it will be proper to investigate the sense in which the preservation of liberty 
requires that the three great departments of power should be separate and distinct.”  Id. 
 61. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-87 547-53 (1969).  Wood 
explains that the Anti-Federalists lacked confidence in the “new” government because of the lack of 
constitutional checks.  Id. at 548.  Anti-federalists from various states emphasized that the three 
branches of government should be separate and distinct, arguing that this was a political fact so well 
established that it could not be questioned.  Id. 
 62. Gerhard Casper, An Essay in Separation of Powers: Some Early Versions and Practices, 
30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 211, 212-24 (1989).  Casper explains that although the constitutional text 
implies the notion of distinct branches, it did not invoke the separation of powers as a principle.  Id. 
at 221; William B. Gwyn, The Indeterminacy of the Separation of Powers and the Federal Courts, 
57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 474, 477-81 (1989).  Gwyn explains the uncertainty among the Framers 
regarding the very nature of the legislative and executive power and how the powers should be 
allocated institutionally.  Id. at 480. 
 63. The phrase “separation of powers” does not appear in the text of the United States 
Constitution.  Dean Alfange, Jr., The Supreme Court and the Separation of Powers: A Welcome 
Return to Normalcy?”, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 668, 670 (1990).  The vestiture clauses assign 
legislative, executive, and judicial powers to Congress; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, the President; U.S. 
CONST. art. II, § 1; and the federal courts, U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.  However, the Constitution 
specifically grants each branch certain powers that seem to fall within the scope of the authority of 
8
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The doctrine of separation of powers is also a “bedrock principle to 
the constitutions of each of the fifty states.”64  Most state constitutions 
have expressly acknowledged separation of powers principles within 
their constitutional texts.65  Cases involving separation of powers issues 
have increased in the last decade,66 and a debate has arisen concerning 
the distinction between a formalistic and functionalistic approach to 
resolving separation of powers questions.67  Those who adopt a formalist 
approach emphasize keeping the three branches of government as 
distinct as possible.68  Formalists argue that the key to separation of 
powers disputes lies in determining whether to characterize the 
challenged action as lawmaking, enforcing, or interpreting the law.69 
                                                          
one of the other branches.  For instance, the House of Representatives has “the sole Power of 
Impeachment;” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5; and the Senate has the “sole power to try all 
Impeachments.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3 cl. 6. 
 64. Jim Rossi, Institutional Design and the Lingering Legacy of Antifederalist  Separation of 
Powers Ideals in the States, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1190 (1999).  There are three basic approaches 
in which state constitutions express separation of powers principles. Id.  First, some state 
constitutions contain a strict separation of powers clause. Id.  This approach is found in an 
overwhelming majority of modern state constitutions, and is strict to the extent that it not only 
divides power between the various branches but also instructs that one branch is not to exercise the 
powers of any of the others.  Id.  Other states incorporate a general separation of powers clause. Id.  
A general separation of powers clause divides the powers of government into three branches 
without prohibiting one branch from exercising the power of another. Id.  The remaining states, 
including Ohio, have no explicit separation of powers clause in the text of their constitutions. Id. 
 65. Id.  See also Bernard Schwartz, Curiouser and Curiouser: The Supreme Court’s 
Separation of Powers Wonderland, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 587, 588 (1990).  Schwartz explains 
that in May 1776, before formal independence was proclaimed, the Second Continental Congress 
adopted a resolution that urged the colonies to set up their own governments.  Id.  Virginia was the 
first state to adopt a Constitution and Declaration of Rights. Id.  The Virgina Constitution included a 
provision purporting that the legislative and executive powers of the state be separate and distinct 
from the judiciary. Id. 
 66. Harold J. Krent,  Separating the Strands in Separation of Powers Controversies, 74 VA. 
L. REV. 1253 (1988) (discussing whether congressional efforts to streamline the adjudicative 
process, congressional endeavors to retain some control over Congress’s broad delegations of 
authority to the executive branch, and increased sensitivities to perceived separation of powers 
infractions have contributed to the growth of litigation). 
 67. See infra notes 68-74 and accompanying text. 
 68. Krent, supra note 66, at 1254 (explaining that formalists base their approach on 
Montesquieu’s model, arguing how the challenged action should be characterized, whereas the 
functionalists refuse to rely on the form of the particular action).  This approach has also been 
referred to as the “ex ante argument.”  See George Anhang, Separation of Powers and the Rule of 
Law: On the Role of Judicial Restraint in “Secur[ing] the Blessings of Liberty,” 24 AKRON L. REV. 
211, 212 (1990) (explaining that “ex ante” arguments attempt to justify the division of government 
power and responsibility into three categories with separate and distinct functions: (1) an executive; 
(2) a legislative; and (3) a judiciary). 
 69. Krent, supra note 66, at 1254  (explaining that actions characterized as lawmaking should 
remain in the province of the legislative; actions characterized as enforcing the law should remain 
the perogative of the executive branch; and actions interpreting the law should fall within the 
domain of the judiciary). 
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In contrast, those who adhere to a functionalist view of separation 
of powers argue that it is impossible to distinguish the branches based 
upon the type of acts they perform.70  In addition, functionalists argue 
that each branch acts in a number of ways when making, interpreting, 
and applying rules in many contexts.71  Thus, as long as the power 
assumed by one branch does not impermissibly intrude into the core 
function that the Framers allocated to another branch, the action should 
be sustained.72 
Because Ohio has no explicit separation of powers clause in its 
constitution, Ohio courts have adopted both views in various situations.  
In Zanesville v. Zanesville Tel. & Tel. Co., the Court adopted a formalist 
approach, holding that “any encroachment by one [branch] upon the 
other is a step in the direction of arbitrary power.”73  In contrast, in Plain 
Dealer Publishing Co. v. Cleveland, the Court determined that the 
separation of powers doctrine “applies only when there is some 
interference with another governmental branch.”74 
                                                          
 70. Id. at 1254-55 (explaining that functionalists believe it impossible to distinguish the 
branches based on the type of acts they perform, and instead ask whether the function exercised by 
one branch impermissibly intrudes into the “core function or domain of the other branch”).  This 
view has also been referred to as the “ex post argument.” Anhang, supra note 63, at 213 (explaining 
that “ex post” arguments are about how the relationship between the judiciary, executive, and 
legislature should be organized, and attempt to justify degrees of independence of each of the three 
branches). 
 71. Krent, supra note 66, at 1255. 
 72. Id. 
 73. City of Zanesville v. Zanesville Tel. & Tel. Co. 59 N.E. 109, 110 (Ohio 1900).  The court 
in Zanesville decided whether a statute that required probate courts to determine the mode in which 
telegraph and telephone companies may use streets and alleys (if the mode of use could not be 
agreed upon between municipal authorities) was legislative or administrative rather than judicial in 
character.  Id. at 109.  The court held that the statute invokes a power on the probate court that is 
legislative in nature, thus finding the statute in violation of separation of powers.  Id. 
 74. State ex rel. Plain Dealer Publishing Co. v. Cleveland, 661 N.E.2d 187, 193 (Ohio 1996).  
In Plain Dealer, the Plain Dealer newspaper filed a writ of mandamus to compel the city to disclose 
the resumes of applicants for police chief pursuant to the Ohio Public Records Act.  Id. at 192.  The 
city contended that the Act violated separation of powers by infringing on the mayor’s executive 
authority to appoint a police chief.  Id.  The court held that because the mayor was not part of the 
executive branch of state government, the Act did not violate separation of powers.  Id.  The court 
reasoned that even if the mayor was part of the executive branch, the doctrine of separation of 
powers applies only where there is some interference with another governmental branch, and that 
disclosure of police chief applicants’ resumes does not unconstitutionally interfere with the mayors’ 
ability to select the best qualified candidate.  Id. at 193.  See also State v. Hochhausler, 668 N.E.2d 
457, 464 (Ohio 1996) (holding that a statute violated the separation of powers because the Act 
“improperly interfered” with the exercise of the court’s functions). 
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III.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This Note involves three factually similar cases,75 which the Court 
consolidated sua sponte.76  In all three cases, pursuant to Ohio Revised 
Code §2967.11, an administrative extension was added to the 
defendants’ original prison terms for offenses committed during their 
incarceration.77  All three prisoners subsequently filed writs of habeas 
corpus.78  Although the Court only tried Bray’s case, the judgment 
applied to White and Haddad as well.  
A.  Facts and Procedural History 
In 1997, Gary Bray was charged with and convicted of drug 
possession, and the court sentenced him to an eight-month prison term. 
79  While Bray was serving his sentence, he allegedly assaulted a prison 
                                                          
 75. Bray, 717 N.E.2d 344; Haddad v. Russell, 717 N.E.2d 344 (Ohio 1999); White v. Konteh, 
709 N.E.2d 850 (Ohio 1999). 
  In White v. Konteh, Samuel White was charged and convicted of receiving stolen property 
and sentenced to a definite term of sixteen-months in prison.  White, 709 N.E.2d at 850.  Six months 
prior to White’s scheduled release he allegedly committed an assault.  Id.  The charge was heard by 
the Noble Correctional Institution’s Rules Infraction Board, which found White guilty of the charge 
and recommended he serve a thirty-day bad time penalty upon the completion of his original 
sentence.  Id.  A few months later, White allegedly committed another assault, and the Rules 
Infraction Board imposed an additional ninety-day bad time penalty.  Id..  Following the imposition 
of the bad time sentence, White was transferred to the Trumbull County Correctional Institution.  Id.  
White filed a writ of habeas corpus in the Court of Appeals, Trumbull County against the warden 
alleging that his continued incarceration was unlawful, as it violated his constitutional right to due 
process.  Id.  White’s writ was granted by the court of appeals, and the state of Ohio appealed; 
In Haddad v. Russell, Richard Haddad was charged and convicted of attempted aggravated assault, 
and sentenced to a nine-month prison term.  Haddad, 717 N.E.2d at 344.  One month before his 
scheduled release, Haddad allegedly committed an assault.  Id.  The Ohio Parole Board imposed a 
ninety-day bad time penalty on his original sentence pursuant to Ohio Revised Code 2967.11(B).  
Id.  Haddad filed an instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Supreme Court of Ohio.  Id. 
 76. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 308 (6th ed. 1990).  The cases this Note involves were 
consolidated sua sponte.  BLACK’S defines “consolidation of actions” as the act or process of uniting 
several actions into one trial and judgment, by order of a court, where all the actions are between the 
same parties, pending in the same court, and involving substantially the same subject matter, issues 
and defenses; or the court may order that one of the actions be tried and the others decided without a 
trial according to the judgment in the one selected and; “sua sponte” is defined as of his or her own 
will or motion; voluntarily; without prompting or suggestion.  Id. at 1424. 
 77. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2967.11 (West 2000), supra note 2. 
 78. The writ of habeas corpus is a “remedy available to effect discharge from any 
confinement contrary to the Constitution or fundamental law, even though imposed pursuant to 
conviction by a court of competent jurisdiction.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 485 (1973).  In 
Preiser, the court found that a habeas corpus proceeding was a proper method to seek restoration of 
prisoners’ good-conduct time credits.  Id. at 487-88. 
 79. Bray, 729 N.E.2d at 360. 
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guard in violation of Ohio Revised Code §2903.13.80  As a result, the 
Rules Infraction Board imposed a ninety-day bad time penalty under 
Ohio Revised Code §2967.11 extending Bray’s original eight-month 
sentence.81 
Bray’s original sentence for drug possession expired on June 5, 
1998.82  After serving one week of bad time, Bray filed a writ of habeas 
corpus in the Court of Appeals of Warren County, claiming that the 
Warden, Harry Russell, was unlawfully restraining him.83  Bray further 
argued that Ohio Revised Code §2967.11 was unconstitutional on its 
face because it violated due process, equal protection, and separation of 
powers.84 
Bray’s Complaint in Writ of Habeas Corpus was still pending when 
he completed his ninety-day bad time penalty sentence, and the warden 
moved to have the case dismissed as moot.85  The Court of Appeals 
denied the warden’s motion because the issues Bray raised were capable 
of repetition, however, the court rejected each of Bray’s constitutional 
challenges.86  Bray then appealed as of right.87 
                                                          
 80. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.13 (West 2000) provides in pertinent part: 
(A) No person shall knowingly cause or attempt to cause physical harm to another or to 
another’s unborn. (B) No person shall recklessly cause serious harm to another or to 
another’s unborn. (C) Whoever violates this section is guilty of assault . . . (2) If the 
offense is committed in any of the following circumstances, assault is a felony in the 
fifth degree: (a) The offense occurs in or on the grounds of a state correctional institution 
or an institution of the department of youth services, the victim of the offense is an 
employee of the department of rehabilitation and correction . . . and the offense is 
committed by a person incarcerated in the state correctional institution. . . . 
§ 2903.13. 
 81. See supra note 2. 
 82. Bray, 729 N.E.2d at 360.  See generally Appelant’s Brief, Bray, 729 N.E.2d 359 (No. 
CA98-06-068) Bray argued that R.C. § 2967.11 was unconstitutional for three reasons: (1) the 
statute allows for punishment without due process of law because it fails to provide an inmate with 
counsel, burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and a public jury trial; (2) the statute violated 
the doctrine of separation of powers because the  establishment of an administrative mechanism to 
investigate, prosecute, and convict inmate offenders of violations of law within a prison rather than 
a court of law, is an illegal intrusion into the domain of the judiciary, and; (3) the statute deprived 
Bray equal protection of the law because the statute permits the state to incarcerate Bray without 
allowing him to exercise his fundamental rights.  Id. 
 83. Bray, 729 N.E.2d at 360. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id.  See also Appellant’s Brief at 13, Bray, 729 N.E.2d 359 (No. CA98-06-068).  First, 
Bray argued that R.C. § 2967.11 was unconstitutional because it allowed for punishment without 
due process of law because it denied prisoners a right to counsel, and a right to a public jury trial, 
and required only a clear and convincing standard of proof, rather than proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  Id. at 13-17.  Second, Bray argued that the statute was unconstitutional because it violated 
the doctrine of separation of powers arguing that by establishing an administrative mechanism to 
investigate, prosecute, and convict inmate offenders of violations of the law within a prison rather 
12
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B.  Reasoning of the Court 
The Supreme Court of Ohio held that the bad time statute was 
unconstitutional because it violated the doctrine of separation of 
powers.88  Relying on its holding in Zanesville v. Zanesville Tel. & Tel. 
Co,89 the Court adopted a formalistic approach to resolve the separation 
of powers question and reasoned that, trying, convicting, and sentencing 
inmates for crimes committed while in prison is not an appropriate 
exercise of executive power. 90 
In a strong dissent, Justice Cook rejected the Court’s adoption of 
the formalistic approach to the separation of powers issue.91  Instead, 
Justice Cook asserted that because the premise of “bad time” is part of 
the original judicially-imposed sentence, its administration by the 
executive branch presents no separation of powers issue.92  Justice Cook 
relied on the holding in Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 93  a 
                                                          
than in a court of law was an illegal intrusion into the domain of the judiciary.  Id. at 18.  Lastly, 
Bray argued that the statute deprived Bray of equal protection of the law because when the statute 
permits the state to incarcerate Bray without allowing him to exercise his fundamental rights, Bray 
and other prisoners are denied equal protection of the law under the state and federal constitutions.  
Id. at 25. 
 87. BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 96 (6th ed. 1990) (explaining within the definition of “appeal” 
that an appeal may be as of right, such as from the trial court to an intermediate appellate court, or 
only at the discretion of the appellate court, such as by writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court). 
 88. Bray, 729 N.E.2d at 362. 
 89. Bray, 729 N.E.2d at 361.  See City of Zanesville v. Zanesville Tel. & Tel. Co., 59 N.E. 
109, 110 (Ohio 1900).  In Zanesville, the court held that,  “[T]he distribution of the powers of the 
government—legislative, executive, and judicial—among three co-ordinate branches, separate and 
independent of each other, is a fundamental feature of our system of constitutional government. . . 
and it is held that any encroachment by one upon the other is a step in the direction of arbitrary 
power” (emphasis added).  Id.  The Bray court explained that even though the judgment in 
Zanesville was reversed, the court still adhered to the principles set forth in the decision.  Bray, 729 
N.E.2d at 362. 
 90. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.  See also Bray, 729 N.E.2d at 361.  The 
court rejected the state’s argument that the doctrine of separation of powers “applies only when 
there is some interference with another governmental branch.”  Id.  Furthermore, the court held that 
“the determination of guilt in a criminal matter and the sentencing of a defendant convicted of a 
crime are solely the province of the judiciary.” Id. at 362. 
 91. Id. at 362-63 (Ohio 2000) (Cook, J., dissenting) (expressing that the interconnected roles 
of the executive and judicial branches of the government under the “bad time” statute would not 
offend the separation of powers doctrine if it were analyzed according to federal jurisprudence on 
the subject because the United States Supreme Court has “squarely rejected” the “archaic view of 
the separation of the powers as requiring three airtight departments of government”). 
 92. Id.  Justice Cook agreed with the State’s argument that “bad time” is part of the original 
judicially imposed sentence, rather than a whole new sentence added on to the original one.  Id. 
 93. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs. 433 U.S. 425, 433 (1977).  In Nixon, former 
President Nixon brought an action challenging the constitutionality of the Presidential Recordings 
and Materials Preservation Act.  Id.  The Court held that in determining whether legislation disrupts 
the proper balance between the coordinate branches of government by infringing on the powers 
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United States Supreme Court decision.  Justice  Cook reasoned that, 
when applying the Nixon approach to the separation of powers issue in 
Bray, the focus would be on the extent to which the “bad time” statute 
prevents the judicial branch from accomplishing its constitutionally 
assigned functions, rather than whether the Rules Infraction Board’s 
delegated function under the statute is “adjudicatory in nature.”94 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
This Note analyzes another argument that may have led the Court 
to the same decision.  If the Ohio Supreme Court had addressed whether 
the “bad time” statute violated the Due Process Clause, the Court may 
have avoided the ongoing debate between the functionalistic and 
formalistic approaches to the doctrine of separation of powers.95  If so, 
the Court clearly could have concluded that the “bad time” statute 
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment for a 
number of reasons. 
The Court’s decision in Bray impliedly acknowledges the notion 
that prisoners are no longer “slaves of the state” who have no civil 
rights.96  The decision in Bray is a step towards eliminating the 
“kangaroo courts”97 within state correctional institutions.  The Court 
wisely concluded that although prison discipline is an executive power, 
the bad time statute enabled the executive branch to exercise powers that 
are solely within the province of the judiciary.98  The bad time statute 
enabled the executive branch to determine whether an inmate committed 
a crime, to prosecute the inmate for the crime, and to impose a sentence 
                                                          
allocated to the executive branch, the focus should be on the extent to which it prevents the 
executive branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned function.  Id. at 443 (emphasis 
added).  The Court reasoned that only where the potential for disruption is present should the Court 
determine whether the impact is justified by an overriding need to promote objectives within the 
constitutional authority of Congress.  Id. 
 94. Id. at 363. 
 95. Bray, 729 N.E.2d at 361.  The court found that Ohio Revised Code § 2967.11 violated the 
doctrine of separation of powers, and thus concluded that the court need not address whether the 
statute violated due process.  Id. 
 96. Robertson, Decline, supra note 5, at 39.  Prior to the twentieth century courts regarded 
prisoners as “slaves of the state” who thus lacked all civil rights.  Id.  Prisoners started to achieve 
modern constitutional status when it was found that the writ of habeas corpus was could be used to 
challenge conditions of confinement.  Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443, 445 (6th Cir. 1944).  See 
also Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. 790 (1871). 
 97. See supra note 10 (explaining “kangaroo courts”). 
 98. Bray, 729 N.E.2d 359, 362.  The court referred specifically to Ohio Revised Code § 
2967.11 (C), (D) and (E).  Id. 
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for that crime.99 
The Court also emphasized that the reason the three branches are 
separate and balanced is to protect the people, not to protect the three 
branches of government.100  When the Court concluded that the bad time 
statute was unconstitutional, it protected the constitutional rights of 
prisoners by eliminating the Rules Infraction Boards’ right to impose a 
bad time sentence, a procedure that embodied the theory of “kangaroo 
courts.”101 
A.  Due Process 
“Due process will not be completely instilled in the penal process 
until constitutionally vague and uncertain prison regulations are 
eliminated.”102  The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
of the United States Constitution reads in pertinent part, “nor shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law. . . .”103 The Due Process Clause provides a number of protections 
to United States citizens.  These protections include a judicial trial 
providing a presumption of innocence,104 proof of guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt,105 the right to confrontation,106 the right of compulsory 
process,107 the right to effective assistance of counsel,108 the right to a 
                                                          
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id.  The court held that the disciplinary hearings pursuant to the bad time statute were not 
less than the executive branch [rules infraction board] acting as judge, prosecutor and jury.  Id. 
 102. David A. Sabot, Judicial Limitations upon Discretionary Authority in the Penal Process, 
8 CAL. W. L. REV. 505, 519 (1972). 
 103. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  See also State v. Spikes, 717 N.E.2d 386, 389-90 (Ohio 
Ct. App. 11th 3d 1998). 
 104. Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 485 (1978) (holding that a person accused of a crime is 
entitled to have his guilt or innocence determined solely on the basis of the evidence introduced at 
trial, and not on grounds of official suspicion, indictment, continued custody, or other circumstances 
not adduced as proof at trial). 
 105. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970) (holding that the reasonable doubt standard plays 
a vital role in the American scheme of criminal procedure, and is a prime instrument for reducing 
the risk of convictions resting on factual error). 
 106. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016 (1988) (holding that the Confrontation Clause 
guarantees a defendant a right to a face-to-face meeting with the witnesses appearing before the trier 
of fact). 
 107. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right . . . to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor”); Washington v. Texas, 
388 U.S. 14, 17-19 (1967) (holding that the Sixth Amendment right applies in state as well as 
federal prosecutions). 
 108. U.S. CONST. amend VI; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 680 (1984) (holding that 
the Sixth Amendment accords criminal defendants a right to counsel reasonably likely to render and 
rendering reasonably effective assistance given the totality of the circumstances). 
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jury trial,109 and the right to a “fair trial in a fair tribunal.” 110 
In the prison context, decisions made by institutional supervisors 
regarding particular individuals are adjudications in which the theory of 
procedural due process applies.111  More specifically, when the state 
seeks to add time onto an inmate’s determinate sentence, a number of 
procedural and substantive rights should be afforded to the inmate to 
ensure the protection of his life and liberty under the Due Process 
Clause.112 
In the present case, Bray argued that the bad time penalty called for 
a new term of incarceration, which constituted a new criminal 
prosecution in which all the protections of procedural Due Process 
should apply.113  Because the purpose of the bad time statute is to 
punish,114 both the Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the United States 
Constitution mandate that punishment cannot be imposed without a prior 
criminal trial and all of the due process rights that go along with it.115 
                                                          
 109. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (holding that a trial by jury in criminal 
cases is fundamental to the American scheme of justice). 
 110. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (holding that a fair tribunal is a basic 
requirement of due process). 
 111. Edward L. Rubin, Due Process and the Administrative State, 72 CAL. L. REV. 1044, 1172 
(1984).  This article proposes an adoption of a general-specific distinction between rule making and 
adjudication as the required limit on the scope of the Due Process Clause.  Id. at 1179.  See also 
Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 576 (8th Cir. 1968). In Bishop the court held that a previous 
criminal record has been referred to as one of the factors a state may take into consideration in 
determining the qualifications of voters.  Id.  However, a prisoner of the state does not lose all 
his/her civil rights during and because of his/her incarceration.  Id.  In particular, the court stated 
that prisoners continue to be protected by the due process and equal protection clauses which 
“follow him through the prison doors.”  Id. at 576. 
 112. See Philip W. Sbaratta, Sandin v. Conner: The Supreme Court’s Narrowing of Prisoners’ 
Due Process and the Missed Opportunity to Discover True Liberty, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 744, 788 
(1996).  This note concluded that the court stands as the only true protector of a prisoner “against 
[the] arbitrary action of government,” and the court’s failure to accept its role of defining the scope 
of the due process clause is tantamount to refusing its chief duty as interpreter of the Constitution.  
Id. 
 113. Vitek v. Jones,  445 U.S. 480 (1980).  In Vitek, the Court concluded that changes in the 
conditions of confinement having a substantial adverse impact on the prisoner are not alone 
sufficient to invoke the protections of the Due Process Clause, “as long as the conditions or degree 
of confinement to which the prisoner is subjected is within the sentence imposed on him.”  Id. at 493 
(emphasis added).  See also Appellant’s Brief at 2, 12, Bray, 729 N.E.2d 359 (No. CA98-06-068). 
 114. See supra notes 51-59 and accompanying text. 
 115. The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution states in pertinent part,  “No 
person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or 
indictment of a Grand Jury. . . nor shall any person be compelled in any criminal case to be a 
witness against himself, not be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law. . . .”  U.S. CONST. amend. V.  The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution states in 
pertinent part,  “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public 
trial, by an impartial jury of the State. . . and to be informed of the nature and case of the accusation; 
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B.  Due Process Violations in the “Bad Time” Statute 
The bad time statute violates an inmate’s due process rights in four 
ways: (1) it is unlikely that there is any presumption of innocence; (2) 
the standard of proof is a lower standard than that guaranteed by the Due 
Process Clause; (3) it denies an inmate the right to counsel; and (4) the 
right to a fair trial in a fair tribunal is abridged. 
First, a question arises of whether a trial conducted by disciplinary 
tribunals within the prison walls provides an inmate with a presumption 
of innocence.116  This seems highly unlikely.  The guilt of charged 
prisoners is usually a foregone conclusion, as the real function of the 
disciplinary hearings is to arrive at an appropriate sanction.117  
Moreover, the disciplinary tribunals face obvious pressure to resolve a 
dispute in favor of the institution.118  Thus, it appears that an inmate 
must abandon his right to a presumption of innocence when standing 
before a disciplinary tribunal, which clearly violates his due process 
                                                          
to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses 
in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.”  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 116. Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478,  483 (1978) (explaining that “the principle that there is 
a presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, 
and its enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law,” citing Coffin v. 
United States which traced the history of the presumption from Deuteronomy through Roman law, 
English Common law, and the common law of the United States). 
 117. Harvard Center for Criminal Justice, Judicial Intervention in Prison Discipline, 63 J. 
CRIM L. CRIMINOLOGY POLICE SCI. 200, 212-18 (1972) (explaining that when the Center examined 
disciplinary hearings at a Rhode Island prison, researchers found little correlation between the 
seriousness of the infraction and the severity of punishment implemented; that demographic 
characteristics and prior disciplinary violations did not affect the choice of penalty, and; that bias, 
personal knowledge about the violator, and security level may have influenced the choice of 
sanctions). 
 118. Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 204 (1985).  In Cleavinger, the Court stated that “it is 
the old situational problem of the relationship between the keeper and the kept, a relationship that is 
hardly conducive to a truly adjudicatory performance.”  Id.  See also Robertson, Impartiality, supra 
note 8, at 334-35.  Robertson suggests that to counter the deficiencies of the “insider” model of 
adjudication, “outsiders” are needed to decide major disciplinary charges.  Id.  Robertson also 
suggests that to ensure the neutrality and independence of adjudicators, departments of corrections 
should follow four necessary and sufficient conditions for impartiality: (1)  adjudicators must be 
sufficiently independent of the warden and other high level correctional administrators to prevent 
command influence; (2) adjudicators must be well versed in the dynamics of prison life; (3) 
adjudicators must be knowledgeable of due process safeguards and committed to impartiality, and; 
(4)  adjudicators should be mindful that non-adjudicative tasks assigned to “outsiders” can impart 
the very institutional bias and institutional knowledge that is so damaging to impartiality, thus their 
involvement in the institution should be limited to deciding disciplinary cases and reviewing those 
administrative decisions that affect interests affected by the Due Process Clause.  Id. at 333-34.  
Robertson also suggests that  should the department of corrections fail in this regard, federal courts 
should stand ready to intervene on behalf of prisoners.  Id. at 335. 
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rights.119 
Next, the bad time statute states that only clear and convincing 
evidence is necessary to sustain a violation, rather than proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt.120  This provision is at odds with the burden of proof 
standard guaranteed by the Due Process Clause, which has been 
interpreted to require that “no man shall lose his liberty unless the 
government has borne the burden of . . . convincing the fact finder of his 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”121  Thus, an inmate must abandon yet 
another right afforded to him under the Due Process Clause when 
standing before a disciplinary tribunal. 
Third, while an appointment of counsel is an absolute requirement 
of due process whenever the proceeding may result in imprisonment, the 
bad time statute denies an inmate this right.122  Although the statute 
provides an inmate with a member of the staff of the institution to assist 
him in presenting his defense, legal counsel does not assist the inmate as 
required by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and 
as required by the Supreme Court in  Strickland v. Washington.123 
Fourth, in In re Murchison, the United States Supreme Court stated 
that “it would be very strange if our system of law permitted a judge to 
act as a grand jury and then try the very persons accused as a result of 
his investigations.”124  However, under the bad time statute, the Rules 
                                                          
 119. See supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text. 
 120. See OHIO REV. CODE § 2967.11(D) (West 2000), supra note 45. 
 121. In re Winship,  397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970) (holding that the reasonable-doubt standard 
plays a vital role in the American scheme of criminal procedure, and it aids in reducing the risk of 
convictions that rest on factual error).  See also Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958).  In 
Speiser, the Court emphasized that there is always a margin of error in litigation which both parties 
must take into account, and where a criminal defendant has his liberty at stake, the margin of error 
is reduced by the process of placing the burden of producing a sufficiency of proof on the other 
party, and of persuading the fact finder at conclusion of the trial of the defendants guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Id. at 525-26.  The court further held that due process commands that no man 
shall lose his liberty unless the government has borne the burden of producing the evidence and 
convincing the fact finder of the defendant’s guilt.  Id. 
 122. Mastin v. Fellerhoff, 526 F. Supp. 969, 973 (D. Ohio 1981). 
 123. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 680 (1984).  See also Ohio Prison Rule No. 
5120-9-091(F).  This rule describes the procedure by which the warden must designate at least one 
staff member to assist inmates in the presentation of his or her defense before the bad time panel of 
the Rules Infraction Board.  Id.  The rule explains that although the staff member is intended to 
assist the inmate in presenting his defense, s/he is not intended to or expected to act as an attorney at 
law or to give legal advice.  Id.  Instead, the staff assistant helps the inmate to: (1) understand the 
rule violation and the nature of the proceedings; (2) prepare a witness list; (3) frame questions for 
his own and opposing witnesses, and; (4) state his defense or response to the allegations in coherent 
language.  Id. 
 124. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 137 (1955).  In Murchison, Michigan law authorized any 
judge of its courts to act as a one man grand jury.  Id. at 133.  The court faced the question of 
whether a contempt proceeding complied with the due process requirement of an impartial tribunal 
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Infraction Board acts as a grand jury and hears the case.125  This 
procedure directly conflicts with the right of a fair trial in a fair 
tribunal.126  Even more troubling than the situation proposed in 
Murchison, defendant Bray’s hearing before the Rules Infraction Board 
was anything but fair because he was charged with assaulting a prison 
guard and was then tried by a disciplinary tribunal composed of nothing 
but prison guards.127 
Not only does the bad time statute deny an inmate the right to a jury 
trial, it denies an inmate the right to a public jury trial.  In State v. Lane, 
the Ohio Supreme Court held that, “[a] trial held within a prison, for an 
offense committed within that same institution, denies the defendant the 
right to a public trial which is a fundamental guarantee of both the 
United States and Ohio Constitutions.”128  However, under the bad time 
statute, disciplinary hearings are held within the institution, rather than 
in a court of law.  Thus, it is evident that the disciplinary hearings, in and 
of themselves, are a violation of the due process right to a jury trial, as 
well as the right to a fair tribunal.129 
                                                          
where the same judge presiding at the contempt hearing had also served as the one man grand jury 
from which the contempt charges arose.  Id.  The court held that it was a violation of due process for 
the “judge-grand-jury” to try the defendants. Id. at 139.  The court reasoned that it would be 
difficult, if not impossible, for a judge to free himself from the influence of what took place in his 
secret grand jury session.  Id. at 138. 
 125. See generally OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 2967.11(C)-(E) (West 2000).  See also Bray, 729 
N.E.2d at 359, 362. 
 126. Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136 (holding that a fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic 
requirement of due process and it follows that no man can be judge in his own case and no man is 
permitted to try cases where he has an interest in the outcome). 
 127. Bray, 729 N.E.2d at 362 (explaining that as part of a prisoner’s sentence, the Board may 
punish a violation by the prisoner, and the “bad time” statute enables the executive branch to 
prosecute an inmate for a crime, determine whether a crime has been committed, and to impose the 
sentence). 
 128. State v. Lane, 397 N.E.2d 1338, 1339 (Ohio 1979).  In Lane, inmates were indicted for 
escape from a penitentiary.  Id. at 1339.  The trial was to be held within the confines of the 
penitentiary for reasons of security and convenience.  Id.  At the trial, the inmates’ defense of duress 
was hampered as many of the subpoenaed witnesses, who were also inmates, refused to testify.  Id.  
The inmates appealed their convictions as they were deprived their constitutional right to a fair trial, 
a public trial, and equal protection of the laws.  Id.  The court concluded that holding a trial within a 
prison for an offense committed within that same institution abridged the constitutional right to a 
fair trial in three ways: (1) the presumption of innocence which must attach to the criminal 
defendant is eroded; (2) there is a major interference with the jury’s ability to remain impartial; and 
(3) the right of the defendant to obtain witnesses is chilled.  Id. at 1340.  The court emphasized that 
the prison environment is laden with a sense of punishment of the guilty within which transmits too 
great an impression of guilt on the part of the inmate on trial.  Id.  The court also emphasized that a 
trial within a maximum security penitentiary with twelve-foot high double walls, armed guards and 
visible barred windows does not allow a jury to maintain the delicate posture of impartiality, a 
bedrock principle in our judicial system.  Id. at 1341. 
 129. See supra notes124-28 and accompanying text.  In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955); 
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C.  Proposed Solutions in the Aftermath of Bray 
The legislature has other means to achieve the apparent goal of the 
bad time statute without violating an inmate’s due process rights, or the 
doctrine of separation of powers.130  For instance, the warden may 
pursue criminal prosecution of inmates who commit violations by 
proceeding through the court system, rather than through the disciplinary 
tribunals within the prison.131  This process ensures that inmates have the 
benefit of constitutional protections.132 
In addition, Ohio could adopt a new statute that contains a limited 
“good time” penalty.133 For example, good time could be used solely as 
a disciplinary mechanism, not as an incentive.134  This limitation on 
traditional good time sentencing schemes would still fulfill the main 
purpose of the bad time statute, which is to punish.135  However, this 
system of good time would not create a new term of incarceration that 
would give rise to a need for a criminal prosecution, which requires the 
procedural and substantive safeguards of the Due Process Clause.136 
Moreover, Ohio could avoid creating a liberty interest by enacting 
parole board release guidelines rather than enacting a statute.137  These 
                                                          
State v. Lane, 397 N.E.2d 1338 (Ohio 1979). 
 130. See infra notes 131-41 and accompanying text. 
 131. White v. Konteh, No. 99-T-0020, 1999 WL587976 at *9 (Ohio App. 11th Dist. Mar. 23, 
1999) (Christley, P.J., concurring) (expressing that there has always been an ability for the warden 
of a prison to pursue criminal prosecution of inmates explaining that it was proven in the aftermath 
of the Lucasville riots that such prosecutions are feasible). 
 132. Id. (explaining that this process was proven to be feasible as a result of the numerous 
prosecutions in the aftermath of the Lucasville riot). 
 133. See Jacobs supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
 134. Jacobs, supra note 26, at 241.  Professor Norval Morris suggested this plan for a limited 
good time penalty although there is no evidence for his conclusion.  Id.  However, Norman Carlson, 
director of the Federal Bureau of Prisoners suggested that under proper management, one could 
enforce prison discipline by granting and withholding furloughs, monetary awards, and transfer.  Id. 
at 242. 
 135. See supra notes 51-59 and accompanying text.  See also White, 1999 WL687976, at *4 
(explaining that under Ohio’s former statutory scheme, a prisoner could earn “good time” which 
entitled the prisoner to have a certain number of days subtracted from his minimum or definite 
sentence, and that “good time” could be revoked as punishment, but it merely meant that the 
prisoner would be required to serve a greater percentage of the minimum or definite sentence 
imposed by the trial court, rather than imposing a separate sentence). 
 136. See supra notes 102-15 and accompanying text. 
 137. Palacios, supra note 22, at 614.  Palacios argues that guidelines direct and limit discretion, 
and without guidelines, discretion is freewheeling.  Id.  The author also describes that in her 
experience as a parole board member, directed discretion is essential to sound decision-making.  Id.  
She explains that after hearing a large volume of cases the human mind is incapable of producing 
consistent, fair decisions and criminals become difficult to distinguish, such that all burglars seem 
alike so their sentences may not be individualized at all.  Id.  The author also explains that release 
guidelines should contain a purpose statement that clarifies that a Parole Board “may” release an 
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guidelines would not have the effect as has law, and thus would only be 
used to clarify the board’s exercise of discretion.138  Such guidelines 
would provide more flexibility than statutory guidelines because, in the 
latter instance, it is not necessary to invoke the legislative process to 
make any changes.139 
Furthermore, Ohio’s correctional facilities still retain the more 
traditional sanctions in punishing offenders.  These sanctions include, 
but are not limited to, such things as solitary confinement, revocation of 
special privileges such as entertainment, recreation, and visiting rights, 
and punishment by requiring the inmate to do extra work within the 
prison.140  Any of these sanctions could potentially fulfill the purpose of 
punishment as provided for in the bad time statute.141 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In Bray, the Ohio Supreme Court has taken a step in the right 
direction, as the very foundation of our state government is the guarantee 
that no person shall be deprived of rights without due process of law.142  
Courts should recognize that there are existing interests that are so 
important to a prisoner’s individual liberty that the judiciary must protect 
                                                          
inmate on parole, therefore not creating a protected liberty interest.  Id. at 599, 614.  The guidelines 
should inform inmates as to what information would be relevant for presentation at the hearing, as 
well as provide a means of accomplishing uniformity, proportionality, and predictability without 
unduly interfering with the parole board’s exercise of discretion.  Id. at 613.  Moreover, the 
guidelines can require the Board to submit a statement of reasons explaining what rationale drove 
their decision, which acts as a guard against arbitrary decisions.  Id. 
 138. Id. at 614.  See also Hall v. Utah Bd. of Pardons, 806 P.2d 217, 218 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).  
In Hall, the Court explained that the guidelines used by the Board of Pardons did not have the force 
and effect of law because they were not mandatory standards that must be followed, but are merely 
guidelines used to clarify the Board’s exercise of discretion.  Id. 
 139. Palacios, supra note 22, at 614 (explaining that parole release guidelines require 
monitoring especially during the time immediately after their adoption, and that there must be an 
allowance made for departures which should be examined for patterns that suggest that the 
guidelines need further adjustment). 
 140. Bruce R. Jacob & K. M. Sharma, Disciplinary and Punitive Transfer Decisions and Due 
Process Values in the American Correctional System, 12 STETSON L. REV. 1, 11 (1982).  Jacobs, 
supra note 26, at 258.  Jacobs expresses that after years of prison research he found that disciplinary 
segregation is perceived by prisoners to be the most important intra-prison punishment.  Id.  Jacobs 
believes that this may be so because of the visible and symbolic character of hauling a prisoner off 
to segregation which is a public act that reverberates throughout the prison community.  Id.  In 
addition, segregation has an immediate and negative effect on the inmate who violates a rule.  Id.  
Jacobs distinguishes segregation from the revocation of good time, which he describes as a mere 
paper punishment.  Id. 
 141. See supra note 140 and accompanying text. 
 142. State v. Spikes, 717 N.E.2d 386, 389-90 (Ohio Ct. App. 11th 1998). 
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in the interest of the Due Process Clause.143 
Although the Ohio Supreme Court based its decision on the bad 
time statute’s violation of the Separation of Powers Doctrine, the same 
decision could have been reached through an inmate’s constitutional 
right to due process.  A neutral magistrate is indispensable, at whatever 
level of the judiciary, as he stands between the accused who wants to be 
free and the law enforcement officials whose function is to facilitate the 
process of keeping them behind bars.144 
Erin K. Cardinal 
                                                          
 143. See Sbaratta, supra note 112 and accompanying text. 
 144. Spikes, 717 N.E.2d at 391.  See also supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
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